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NOTES AND COMMENTS

premises by the "nuisance."

See, HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1938) 593;

at 220; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)

§339.

Indiana courts have followed the stricter rule and have insisted
that the plaintiff be in fact attracted on to the premises by the instrumentality. The "nuisance" is said to create "an implied invitation
by leaving a thing exposed and unguarded which is of such a nature
as to tempt and allure young children." Chicago and Erie R.R. V. Fox,
38 Ind. App. 268, 275, 70 N.E. 81, 84 (1906).
See also Drew -v.Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N.E. 547 (1932);
Note (1933) 8 IND. L. T. 508; (1925) 36 A.L.R. 28, at 77, 78.
The Indiana courts have found the doctrine inapplicable where
the plaintiff was not in fact attracted by the injurious instrument;
see Holstine v. Director General of R.R., 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N.E.
303 (1922); (1925) 36 A.L.R. 28, at 78; as the injured "did not discover such place until after they had themselves become trespassers."
Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup, 88 Ind. App. 572, 578, 165
N.E. 246, 248 (1929).
However, Indiana by statute has excepted cases involving electricity from the general rule, and has stipulated "that in the transmission and use of electricity of a dangerous voltage, full and complete insulation shall be provided at all points where the public . . .
are liable to come into contact with the wires." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
1933) § 20-304. In these cases anticipation of the danger, rather
than the fact of attraction seems to be the important element. Ft.
Wayne and No. Ind. Traction Co. v. Stark, 74 Ind. App 669, 127 N.E.
460 (1920); Harris v. Indiana Gen'l Service, 206 Ind. 351, 189 N.E.
410 (1934) (but neither case mentioned the statute).

WORKMENS COMPENSATION
ILLEGITIMATE DEPENDENTS
The father of two minor children refused to support them or their
mother. The mother went to live in adultery with the deceased, taking
the children with her. During the five-year period of cohabitation,
the deceased was their only means of support. Upon his death in
an industrial accident, the mother and children applied to the Industrial Board for compensation. The board refused their application
and the children appealed. Held, that the children are entitled to
compensation even though they bore no legal relation to the deceased.,
At common law, illegitimate children were social outcasts; for all
practical purposes the rights and duties of the parent-child relationship
applied only when the relationship was legitimate.2 Even today, this
dogma persists to some extent, as evidenced by statutes pertaining to
deeds and wills.3
1.
2.
3.

Russell v. Johnson, -Ind. App.-, 42 N.E. (2d) 392 (1942).
Gavit, B1. Comm. (1941) 199; Peck, Domestic Relations (3rd ed.
1930) § 141; Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921) H5 711714; Tiffany, Domestic Relations (3d ed. 1921) § 114.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-2309; Gavit, The Indiana Law
of Future Interests, Descent, and Wills (1934) § 143 (f); Vernier
and Churchill, Inheritance by and from Bastards (1935) 20 Iowa
L. Rev. 216 (giving a table of statutes from the various states

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

In cases under workmen's compensation statutes, there is some
divergence of opinion as to whether illegitimates can recover upon
the death of one upon whom they depend for support.4 While some
of the older cases looked with disfavor on recovery by illegitimates,5
the modern trend, and it is submitted, the better rule of statutory
construction, is that they can recover. 6
Cases allowing recovery base it on a conclusive presumption of
dependency for children and all others within the deceased's family
circle or household.7 The statute governing the principal case makes
such a provision for acknowledged illegitimate children. 8 The general
rule seems to be the same for adopted children, the only limitation
being that they be legally adopted.9 Stepchildren also come within
the meaning of the statute. 0

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

relating to inheritance by and from the bastard); Comment (1936)
84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 531.
Note (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 224 (gives a comprehensive analysis
of cases and statutes relating to a bastard's rights under workman's compensation statutes); Note (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 808.
Murrell v. Industrial Comm., 291. Ill. 334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920);
Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 Atl. 117 (1920). "It
would be giving the word 'child' or 'children' a much broader
meaning than is usually given it at law to hold that it meant in
this statute illegitimate child or children."
Olson's Case, 247
Mass. 570, 142 N.E. 808 (1924) ; cf. Bell v. Terry & Tench Co., 177
App. Div. 123, 163 N.Y.S. 733 (1917). "It is a rule of construction that, prima facie, the word 'child' or 'children,' when used in a
statute means legitimate child or children." However, this was
followed by a statutory amendment admitting an acknowledged
illegitimate child to be a dependent. Laws of N.Y., 1922, c. 615,
§ 2 (11).
See note 4 supra.
Carter v. Templeton Coal Co., 86 Ind. App. 175, 156 N.E. 518
(1927); Piccinim v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 93 Conn. 423,
106 At. 330 (1919); Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204, 127 N.E. 889
(1920); Roberts v. Whaley, 192 Mich. 133, 158 N.W. 209 (1916).
The English position also seems to be in accord with this view.
Lloyd v. Powell-Duffryn Steam Coal Co., 6 B.R.C. 827 (1914).
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 40-1403; Ind. Adm. Code (Horack,
1941) § 40-1403. "The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: . . . (c) A child under the age of eighteen (18) years
upon the parent with whom he or she is living at the time of the
death of such parent . . . As used in this section, the term child
shall include stepchildren, legally adopted children, posthumous
o
children, and acknowledged illegitimate children . . .
See note 8 supra; accord, Ellis v. Nevius Coal Co., 100 Kan. 187,
163 Pac. 654 (1917); Gros v. Miller Indemnity Underwriters
153 La. 257, 95 So. 709 (1923); see Kinnard v. Tennessee Chemicai
Co., 157 Tenn. 206, 7 S.W. (2d) 807, 808 (1928).
See note 8 supra; Wilson v. LaPorte Gas & Electric Co., 107
Ind. App. 21, 22 N.E. (2d) 882 (1939) (allowed recovery even
though the stepchildren's father was still living and legally obligated to support them); Newark Packing Co. v. Rlotz, 85 N.J.L.
432, 91 Ati. 91 (1914), aff'd, 86 N.J.L. 690, 92 AtI. 1086 (1915);
Shanley v. Slattery Contracting Co., 232 App. Div. 860, 248 N.Y.S.
774 (1931); Shimkus v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal
& Iron
Co.,
CompenState
280 Pa. 88, 124 At. 335 (1924); see MeManus v.
sation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 566, 169 S.E. 172, 173 (1933).
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Thus in all these instances of illegitimates, adopted children, and
stepchildren, the basis upon which recovery is allowed seems to be
dependency in its broadest sense rather than any technical legal
relationship."
Generally stated, a dependent under workmen's compensation statutes is one who depends upon the deceased for support or help, or
for the reasonable necessities of life,12 and the cases indicate that
the manner or the legality of the relationship out of which the dependency arose is disregarded.Is
The theory of workmen's compensation is clearly a social one,
embodying a social policy designed to distribute the burden of losses
by industrial accidents among industries generally, rather than allowing the burden to fall on one person or small group of persons.' 4
This policy should not in any way be controverted by the fact
that the claimants do not bear the proper legal or moral relationship
to the one upon whom they depend for support. 15 Particularly should
this be true where the claimants are infants. Nothing in their conduct calls for punishment, nor will the cause of morality be advanced
by denying them compensation.11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

See Kinnard v. Tennessee Chemical Co., 157 Tenn. 206, 7 S.W.
(2d) 807, 808 (1928). "It is apparent that if a stepchild or
an illegitimate child is entitled to compensation under the act,
the test of liability cannot be made to depend upon the relationship which the child bore to the deceased workman, but the
test is whether such child was wholly dependent upon such workman for support." Cf. Jones v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co.,
209 Ky. 642, 273 S.W. 494 (1925) (saying that one of the purposes of the statute is the protection of children); Memphis Fertilizer Co. v. Small, 160 Tenn. 235, 22 S.W. (2d) 1037 (1930)
(extended the meaning of "child" to include any dependent child);
McManus v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 566, 169
S.E. 172 (1933). Contra: Moore's Case, 294 Mass. 557, 3 N.E.
(2d) 5 (1936); Welsh v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.
387, 26 N.E. (2d) 198 (1940). Both cases refused recovery on
the ground that the children were not members of the deceased's
family, rather than on the fact that they were dependent in fact
upon him for support.
In re Carroll, 65 Ind. App. 146, 116 N.E. 844 (1917); Alden
Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm. 293 Ill. 597, 127 N.E. 641 (1920);
Rockford Cabinet Co. v. Industrial Comm., 295 IlI. 332, 129 N.E.
142 (1920); Rock Island Bridge & Iron Works v. Industrial Comm.,
287 Ill. 648, 122 N.E. 830 (1919). At least two cases hold that
the test of dependency is whether or not contributions were made.
Clover Fork Coal Co. v. Ayers, 219 Ky. 326, 292 S.W. 803 (1927);
Sigalove v. Pensel, 218 App. Div. 306, 218 N.Y.S. 85 (1926).
See note 11 supra.
Piccinim v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 93 Conn. 423, 106
At. 330 (1919).
Cf. Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 185 Calif. 200, 196 Pac. 257, 259 (1921) "The
benefits of this law are not provided as an indemnity for negligent acts committed or as compensation for legal damages sustained, but as an economic insurance measure to prevent a sudden break in the contribution of the worker to society by his accidental death." L. E. Meyers Co. v. Noland, 222 Ky. 748, 2 S.W.
(2d) 387 (1928).
See note 11 supra.

16. Piccinim v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 93 Conn. 423, 106
Atl. 330 (1919).

